March 11, 2025

Blog, Traditional Knowledge

Why the WIPO IGC Deadlocked

By: Chidi Oguamanam Chidi Oguamanam, representative of Nigeria and University of Ottowa Professor of Law, provides analysis of the failure to endorse a new consolidated text by the 50th session of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions (WIPO-IGC). The article was originally published by ABS Canada, and is reprinted here with the author’s permission.   Link to article Discord over Rights and Measures-Based Approaches to the Protection of TK and TCEs Scuttles WIPO IGC 50 By: Chidi Oguamanam Backdrop to the 50th WIPO IGC Session At the 50th session of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions (WIPO-IGC), delegates arrived with expectations for a better outcome. However, after one week of deliberations from March 3-7, 2025, experts and diplomats failed to achieve consensus over an improved working text of international legal instrument(s) for the protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions (TK/TCEs). The last session of the WIPO-IGC (the 49th session) was stalemated because the majority of delegates agreed that they failed to narrow gaps in the working texts of TK and TCEs from the 47th WIPO-IGC session. At the 49th session, delegates resolved not to transmit any instruments to the 50th session, which meant that they would fall back to the text of the 47th session to the collective disappointment of the Committee and its Finnish Chair, Anna Vuopala, at the December 2024 meetings. The 50th WIPO-IGC session was chaired by Brazilian diplomat Ms. Erika Patriota, who was invested in breaking the jinx of the 49th session. Despite her best efforts through a methodology that relied heavily on informal sessions as well as drew from the facilitation skill of the Filipino Friend of the Chair, Anne Adlon, the session’s intended purpose to narrow gaps and deliver on an improved text of negotiating instruments was not met. A hopeful start on the first couple of days resulted in ridding the two working texts (TK and TCEs) of a few redundant and unsupported alternative articles. However, a methodological failure arising from not reining in delegates who were determined to contribute new textual language, and who were determined to even substitute in wholesale fashion some existing articles, pushed the Committee off-balance away from narrowing gaps. Rights and Measures-Based Approach is Now a Critical Schism There was a palpable ideological schism among delegates on the perennial high level conceptual question over the nature of the instrument in relation to intellectual property rights. On one side are demandeur delegations who favour negotiating the TK/TCEs instruments as sui generis, or what one delegate characterizes as “IP+.”  On the other side are those who prefer that the instruments be in sync with conventional IP rights – with term limits, elaborate exceptions and limitations, and accommodation of the so-called “vibrant public domain.” More prominently and equally worrisome at the 50th WIPO-IGC session was a palpable division among delegates along “rights-based” and “measures-based” approaches to the protection of TK and TCEs. In simple terms, the rights-based approach is premised on the recognition of inalienable and existing rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) to their TK and TCEs as a fundamental anchor for the protection of those rights and the premise upon which any consequential measures are based. On the other hand, proponents of the measures-based approach, who are mainly non-demandeurs led by the United States and its allies in Group B (Japan, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, UK), the EU, the Central European and Baltic States (CEBS), etc., are inclined toward a measures-based approach. The latter group of proponents of the measures-based approach proactively emphasizes and promotes a list of policy, regulatory, persuasive, and non-binding measures to encourage the “safeguarding” of TK and TCEs. In the opinion of these proponents, a soft-law (i.e., non-binding) approach is the preferred nature of such measures. The argument is that, in accordance with its mandate, the Committee should not prejudge the nature of the instrument that will result from its work. For most non-demandeurs, a measures-based approach is a suitable pathway to a non-binding treaty. For the demandeurs, that is, IPLCs as well as mostly developing countries of the global south who coalesce around the mainly fluid category of like-minded countries (LMCs), the African Group, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), India, China, and some members of the Asia Pacific Group (APG), a rights-based approach is preferred. The demandeurs support a stronger and binding instrument in the nature of the already-concluded treaty from the work of the Committee – the 2024 WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. For this group, the fact that the Committee is required not to prejudge the outcome of its deliberations does not preclude designing a binding instrument. For demandeurs, the narrow focus of non-demandeurs on a non-binding instrument misses the other consideration regarding the outcome of the Committee’s work, which relates to whether it would result in a single or multiple instruments. At the beginning, the Committee set out on a pathway to three instruments, namely, TK, TCEs and Genetic Resources (GRs).  It has agreed on only one instrument so far, which is the binding instrument on GRs. Cut-and-Paste Merger for Artificial Consolidation Despite a lack of consensus, the 50th IGC attempted to merge the two remaining negotiating instruments on TK and TCEs into one document, in contrast to their being negotiated in parallel, which has been the practice. It is not as if no attempt has been made in the past at consolidating the two remaining documents. In February 2023 and March 2023, the Jamaican Chair of the IGC, Lilly-Clair Bellamy, raised the Chair’s Consolidated Texts of TK and TCEs, which some delegations wanted to be used as a working instrument at the aborted 49th session of the IGC. The attempt at the equally aborted 50th session to merge both texts in a cut-and-paste merging approach reflects the potential inclination of delegations toward a consolidated instrument. The Committee appears open to consider a single TK/TCE instrument to complement the

Blog, Broadcast Treaty

The (Long) Road to the Broadcast Treaty: A Brief History

Lokesh Vyas; Luca Schirru; Sean Flynn  Members of the research team from the Program of Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP)’ Geneva Center published a “Documentary History of the Broadcast Treaty in the SCCR” (2025). Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series. 145. https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/145/ The document traces the discussions and statements made by Member States across all SCCR and General Assembly meetings from the launch of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights in 1998 to the 45th meeting of the committee in 2024. The history can be used to analyze the evolution in the statements, positions, and proposals of countries over this long history. This note describes the pre-history of the Broadcasting Treaty before the creation of the SCCR. Berne Convention Broadcasting entered the international copyright scene in the 1928 Rome Revision of the Berne Convention, with the introduction of Article 11bis to the Berne Convention: “Article 11bis: (1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the communication of their works to the public by radio-diffusion.(2) The national legislations of the countries of the Union may regulate the conditions under which the right mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be exercised, but the effect of those conditions will be strictly limited to the countries which have put them in force. Such conditions shall not in any case prejudice the moral right (droit moral) of the author, nor the right which belongs to the author to obtain an equitable remuneration which shall be fixed, failing agreement, by the competent authority.”[2] The exclusive right in 11bis is limited to communications “to the public” by the particular means of “radio-diffusion.” It thus did not cover issues such as rebroadcasts by other means (e.g. cable, internet, etc.) or one-to-one transmissions. Article 11bis(2) gives governments flexibility in how to regulate the right. The importance of public interest regulation was emphasized by the Sub-Committee on Broadcasting which discussed the issue at the conference.[3]  In 1948, Article 11bis(1) was expanded to cover additional technologies, and Article 11bis(3) was introduced, creating an exception for “ephemeral recordings made by a broadcasting body by means of its own facilities and used for its own emissions”.[4] The provision also permitted legislation to authorize the preservation of such recordings in official archives if they held exceptional documentary value.  The 1967 Stockholm Revision brought further modifications: Article 11bis(1) was revised to include the terms “broadcasting” and “rebroadcasting”. Article 11bis(2) remained unchanged; the wording of Article 11bis(3) was slightly modified, though without any substantial legal effect. Rome Convention The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome, 1961) convened jointly by two UN agencies: ILO and UNESCO, as well as BIRPI (WIPO’s predecessor), included a related right of broadcasting organizations. As James Love has described:  “Broadcasting organizations made a discrete case for inclusion in the treaty as a beneficiary, even when making no creative contribution. Backed by sheer lobbying power, broadcasters claimed that, unlike theater owners, record or bookstores, they were tasked with making works available to the public without direct compensation from listeners, often with additional public service obligations, and were entitled to rights, even when none existed for the works broadcast.”[5] The treaty defined “broadcasting” as “the transmission by wireless means for public reception”[6] and “rebroadcasting” as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organisation of the broadcast of another broadcasting organisation”.[7] The treaty was thus limited to the protection of live broadcasts by traditional wireless means. The Rome Convention included a list of permissible limitations and exceptions.[8] Brussels Convention As Delia Lipszyc noted with the rise of orbiting or geostationary satellites in international telecommunications since 1965, broadcasting organizations expressed the need for adequate protection against the ‘piracy of signals’ when their television programmes were transmitted by space satellites.[9] The Rome Convention left ambiguity on this issue as it only covered “wireless” transmissions, raising doubts about whether it applied to broadcasts relayed through satellites.  International discussions on the legal challenges of “intercontinental broadcasts of television programmes by satellite” began in 1968 and 1969. Following these meetings, UNESCO and BIRPI jointly convened a Committee of Governmental Experts to examine copyright and related rights issues affecting performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters due to satellite transmissions. The committee met three times—in Lausanne (1971), Paris (1972), and Nairobi (1973)—laying the groundwork for the 1974 Diplomatic Conference in Brussels.[10] In the 1974 Brussels Diplomatic Conference Report, Lipszyc notes that the General Rapporteur highlighted the issue’s urgency, as recognized by the three Committees of Governmental Experts. They explored several possible solutions, including: 1.) the revision of the International Telecommunication Convention or of the annexed Radio Regulations; the revision of the Rome Convention (1961); 2.) the adoption of a new multilateral Convention; or 3.) some other formula, such as the confirmation of the existing international agreements or 4.) the adoption of a straightforward resolution condemning the piracy of signals. Quoting from Lipszyc:  “As the preparatory work progressed, a consensus emerged in favour of the third solution; even though some countries considered that the Rome Convention granted broadcasters protection against unauthorized rebroadcasting of their signals transmitted by satellites, it was still clear that, because of the few accessions to that Convention, it did not immediately lend itself to a solution of this problem at world level. … At the meetings of the three Committees of Experts, discussions focused mainly on a number of drafts of a new multilateral convention designed to prevent the rebroadcasting of signals transmitted via satellites by distributors for whom they were not intended; but it proved particularly difficult to arrive at a general consensus on the content and terms of this Convention”. The above-referred Report highlighted that the main difficulty arose at the meeting of the First Committee of Governmental Experts (Lausanne, 1971) and took up a great deal of the proceedings of all three preparatory meetings. The problem was to know whether, if exclusive rights were granted to the originating broadcasting organizations in the sphere of private law and within a new international

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