June 12, 2025

By Yuanxiao Xu. This post was originally published on Authors Alliance. “One need not be a copyright scholar to evaluate fair use. One need only understand the purpose of copyright. — Leval wins my heart forever” Brandon Butler’s drawing of Judge Leval. CC BY 4.0. If you have spent much time exploring U.S. copyright law, you’d likely have encountered the writings—or at least the influence—of Judge Pierre Leval. Among many other contributions, his “Toward a Fair Use Standard” article built a solid foundation for modern fair use jurisprudence. On the bench, Judge Leval’s opinions are famed for their clarity and balance, always mindful of “copyright’s overall objective of contributing to public knowledge,” as can be seen in his landmark decision in Authors Guild v. Google.  On May 23rd, another very important opinion was authored by Judge Leval for the Second Circuit Court in Romanova v. Amilus Inc. Although we won’t delve into it further in this blog post, his opinion provides much-needed clarification on “justification” post-Warhol—guidance that we hope many courts will follow in the coming years. The case facts in Romanova were simple and straightforward: a photographer sued a website for republishing her photo without permission. The district court wrongly found fair use, and the Second Circuit reversed.  The opinion authored by Judge Leval was characteristically thoughtful, not only in its substantive treatment of fair use, but also in its strong affirmation of the district court’s decision to raise fair use sua sponte (Latin for “of one’s own accord “—sua sponte is used to indicate that a court has taken notice of an issue on its own motion, without prompting or suggestion from either party). This post focuses on that procedural dimension of Romanova and goes one step further, explaining why fair use should never have been treated as an affirmative defense in the first place. For decades, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose has been celebrated as a decision that fortified fair use. But ironically, the decision also ossified the view that fair use is strictly an affirmative defense—significantly limiting the power of fair use to safeguard free expression in practice. Even where lower courts are doubtful, they nevertheless feel bound by the way the Campbell court construed fair use as an affirmative defense. In a footnote in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, the Eleventh Circuit Court mused: “fair use is commonly referred to an affirmative defense, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music . . . Nevertheless, the fact that the fair use right must be procedurally asserted as an affirmative defense does not detract from its constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First Amendment purposes.” Now, Judge Leval (whose influential scholarship was cited with approval in Campbell) is helping to restore the power of fair use as a fundamental right—one that cannot be waived, forfeited, or overlooked due to procedural missteps.  Although the case facts and substantive fair use ruling in Romanova are relatively routine, its procedural holding stands out as especially noteworthy. It restores to fair use its legal force and its human dimension.  The district court in Romanova, acting on its own initiative, dismissed the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim on the basis of the defendant’s use being a fair use, even though the defendant had not appeared in court and never raised the fair use defense.  The Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to consider fair use sua sponte. While the court did not go so far as to declare that fair use is not an affirmative defense, Judge Leval’s opinion strips away some of the harmful consequences of treating fair use procedurally rigidly. According to Judge Leval, justice should not depend on one party’s ability to afford litigation, and that courts are always empowered to consider obvious, meritorious fair use defenses. Recognizing how imbalances in power play out in costly copyright litigation, Judge Leval reasoned with clairvoyance: At times, small corporations simply cannot afford the expense of counsel needed to defend a suit. Default does not necessarily preclude the court’s consideration of affirmative defenses available to the defendant, especially when they have obvious merit and their applicability is evident from the face of the complaint. Otherwise, plaintiffs could often easily inflict unjustified harms on small corporate enemies. Intimidation tactics would threaten to strip small creators of their content, and would silence the numerous small platforms that need the protection of the fair use doctrine. (emphasis added) He concluded: The district court here believed that its consideration of the fair use defense would serve justice and advance the goals of copyright. [The district] court misunderstood the fair use defense, which in fact had no proper application to these facts. But we cannot fault the district court for considering a defense which it believed (albeit mistakenly) was valid and important. While district courts should indeed be cautious before sua sponte invoking affirmative defenses on behalf of defaulting defendants, they should also be cautious about not considering such defenses. Up until this opinion, many courts have doggedly followed the mistaken belief that defendants must plead fair use in their answer or a motion to dismiss, or risk waiving it—because fair use has been characterized rigidly as an affirmative defense, a position reinforced by lower courts’ reading of Campbell.  An affirmative defense first admits that a wrongful act has occurred, then offers a justification or excuse that negates culpability. The wrongfulness of the act is central to the concept of an affirmative defense. For example, a bribe given in a foreign country is wrongful by nature, but if the foreign country’s written law allows for such payments, it can serve as an affirmative defense; a board of directors neglecting fiduciary duty is wrongful by nature, but they can use a later shareholder rectifying vote as an affirmative defense; most famously, perhaps, killing another human is wrongful by its nature, but self defense is an affirmative defense. Because of the innate wrongfulness of the acts in such circumstances, it seems reasonable that the presumed wrongdoer must raise an affirmative defense and support it with evidence.  However, fair use is not a wrongful act by nature, and treating it as though it were fundamentally misunderstands its role in copyright law. Unlike bribery, breach of fiduciary