Last year, two new intellectual property treaties were adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization — one on the disclosure of uses of genetic resources in patent applications and a second on applications for design law protection. Although the design law treaty was promoted by wealthy countries of the global north, the final outcome shows the impact of developing countries who advocated for deleting or softening provisions that regulated substantive design law while protecting the ability to require information related to Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCEs), Traditional Knowledge (TK), or biological and genetic resources (GR). Opening the closed list for application criteria The main intent of the Design Law Treaty was described as harmonizing procedures and formalities for applying for design law protection. There is very little substantive international law on design protection, and the treaty was not billed as creating such minimum requirements. However, by proposing to restrict the elements that may be requested in a design law application, the basic proposal for the treaty in effect restricted what elements could be considered in granting protection. The basic proposal for the treaty followed the Trademark Law Treaty in proposing a closed list of elements that could be required in an application. The closed nature of the list was made clear in subsection 2 of what was ultimately included as Article 4 of the treaty, which states: “[Prohibition of Other Requirements] No indication or element, other than those referred to in paragraph (1) and in Article 10, may be required in respect of the application.” The problem with a closed list of application criteria is that it limits the substantive criteria that governments can rely upon in granting design law protection. As Bagley (2018, 995-996) argued: “by delineating a closed list of application requirements that countries can impose on applicants, the DLT in effect moves beyond formalities to placing substantive limits on countries in relation to design registration”. In the early stages of consideration of the Treaty, developing countries focused on the lack of language in the closed list allowing countries to require disclosure of traditional cultural expressions, traditional knowledge, or genetic resources used in the design seeking protection. The basic proposal for the DLT included two alternatives on these issues: “ALTERNATIVE A [(ix) a disclosure of the origin or source of traditional cultural expressions, traditional knowledge or biological/genetic resources utilized or incorporated in the industrial design;]” “ALTERNATIVE B [(ix) an indication of any prior application or registration, or of other information , of which the applicant is aware, that is relevant to the eligibility for registration of the industrial design;]” During the negotiation, Knowledge Ecology International raised other issues that the United States and other laws require disclosure of in design law applications that were not included in the closed list. These included, for example, requirements to disclose uses of public funding and artificial intelligence in the creation of the design. There was considerable opposition from the “Group B” wealthy countries of the global north to the language in Alternative A including reference to “biological/genetic resources” in the permitted elements of an application. Delegations argued that such resources were not relevant to design law. In the end, the compromise text excluded direct mention of genetic resources but adopted open language that permits countries to require any application element deemed “relevant” to the registration of the design: Article 4 … (2) [Indication of Information] A Contracting Party may require, where permitted under the applicable law, that an application contain an indication of any prior application or registration, or of other information, including information on traditional cultural expressions and traditional knowledge, of which the applicant is aware, that is relevant to the eligibility for registration of the industrial design. (3) [Prohibition of Other Requirements] No indication or element, other than those referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) and in Article 12, may be required in respect of the application. The final outcome thus permits countries to allow disclosures of genetic resource information as well as information about uses of public funding, artificial intelligence, and other elements that a country deems relevant to the registration. Eliminating Term of Protection The basic proposal for the DLT included two options for requiring a term of protection. Term of protection is indisputably substantive, and many countries opposed its inclusion in the treaty on this basis. But two other treaties — the Hague Agreement and the WTO’s TRIPS agreement — have minimum terms of protection of 5 years and 10 years respectively. A proposal by the USA would have harmonized members to a minimum 15-year term, which is the present US law. [Article 9Bis Term of protection A Contracting Party shall provide a term of protection for industrial designs of at least 15 years from either: (a) the filing date, or (b) the date of grant or registration.], proposed by USA.[Article 9Bis Term of protection Contracting Parties shall have the option to comply with Article 17 of the Hague Convention or Article 26 of the TRIPS Agreement.], proposed by Nigeria. There was united opposition to any term of protection in the agreement by the Africa Group, GRULAC, and APG. As a result, fairly early on in the negotiation, Article 9bis was dropped from the negotiating text and no term of protection was included in the final treaty. Making the Grace Period Optional The basic proposal included language on grace periods during which a design could be disclosed without affecting its registerability. There are no regulations of grace periods in the Patent Law Treaty, Trademark Law Treaty, or the Hague Agreement. Concerns were raised that this provision may disproportionately favor larger firms in weather countries that “can afford to disclose their designs publicly without immediately filing for protection, potentially stalling local competitors who lack the financial or legal capacity to navigate complex intellectual property landscapes”. The final text established a grace period of 12 months but made this provision subject to a reservation. Thus, countries may join the agreement without binding themselves to the grace period
