Africa

In Part I of this blogpost, I briefly set out the procedural history of the copyright reform process that led to the Presidential Referral of the Bill to the Constitutional Court. I also briefly explained the scope of Referral proceedings and the parties involved. In this Part, I discuss the issues raised during the hearing and what to expect going forward. Issues raised during the hearing In line with the Court’s past jurisprudence, the proceedings centred around the constitutionality of the two sets of provisions referred by the President on the basis that he referred them – the fair and equitable remuneration provisions and the new exceptions and limitations. I discuss the arguments raised regarding each set in turn. I focus here on the oral submissions – the full written submissions on record are available here. Fair and equitable remuneration (proposed sections 6A, 7A, 8A) On the fair and equitable remuneration provisions, the President remained concerned that these provisions apply retrospectively which, in his view, would constitute arbitrary deprivation of property. The President explained that although Parliament deleted the specific subsections that explicitly provided for the retrospective application of the provisions, he believed that the provisions were still applicable retrospectively. Retrospectivity, he argued, would constitute a substantial interference in the copyright owner’s enjoyment of their property (and the profits derived from it) as it would open up the possibility for windfall gains for authors notwithstanding whether their original historical assignment of copyright was unfair. Moreover, the President argued that the indiscriminate application of these provisions to all past and future assignments constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property. To prevent retrospective application, the President argued that it was necessary for the language of the provisions to explicitly state that they would apply prospectively. Underlying this argument, the President confirmed that in his view, copyright constituted a constitutionally protectable set of property interests. When questioned, the President conceded that should these provisions be read exclusively prospectively they would not be unconstitutional. The President’s initial position was supported by the Freedom Front Plus. It was also supported by the Democratic Alliance who argued that the only reasonable interpretation of these provisions was that they applied retrospectively to past and future profits derived from the exploitation of the work under copyright. On a prospective interpretation, the DA argued, the language that allows the existence of an agreement to the contrary in proposed section 6A(2) would render the provision a nullity. The DA also supported the proposition that these provisions ran the risk of arbitrarily depriving copyright owners of their property on the basis that there was a substantial interference with the right by significantly reducing its value, imposing uncertainty costs upon the entire industry and interfering with the contractual autonomy of the parties. Further, the DA argued that the lack of similar language in sections 7A and 8A was irrational – and although the President adopted this argument in his oral submissions, irrationality was not expressly part of the 2020 or 2024 Referral letter, raising the question whether the Court can consider it. NAB/SANEF/CFE aligned themselves with the arguments made by the President that these provisions had retrospective effect and ran the risk of arbitrarily changing the rights negotiated and acquired by broadcasters in the current regime, asserting that the broadcasting industry may face dire consequences as a result. Parliament, however, explained in their oral submissions that they had a clear legislative intent to ensure that the impugned provisions had prospective effect. This intent was demonstrated by the deletion of the relevant subsection from all three provisions, as acknowledged by the President, in addressing the reservations set out in his 2020 Referral letter. Recreate Action aligned with Parliament’s position on the deletion of the explicit retrospectivity provisions, and argued that there is a presumption against retrospectivity in the law. Where a provision can be read prospectively, it must be read in that manner. Recreate Action responded to the DA’s argument that a prospective reading of section 6A renders it a nullity by explaining that the non-obstante clause in that section would ensure its continued application. In any event, Recreate Action argued that even if the impugned provisions applied retrospectively, that did not in and of itself render them unconstitutional. To the extent that they were a deprivation of property, Recreate Action argued that even if copyright was incorporeal constitutional property, it required a lower threshold of justification for such deprivation, and that the deprivation only encompassed a single incident of ownership – the royalty right. Finally, Recreate Action responded to the claim of indiscriminate application as arbitrariness by explaining that the standards of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ in the text of these provisions act as levers to calibrate the application of these provisions to address unequal bargaining power and prevent any windfall gains.   In addition to testing these arguments, the Court raised concerns about the specificity of the President’s reservations with regard to these provisions. In particular, the Court was concerned as to whether Parliament had a meaningful opportunity to address the whole of these provisions – in other words, whether the President’s 2020 Referral letter flagged the whole of these provisions as triggering his reservations, or just the relevant subsection that explicitly provided for their retrospective application. If the Court were to find that the whole provisions were not referred to Parliament – to enable Parliament’s consideration of them prior to the Referral to the Court – this may bar the consideration of the merits. New exceptions including education and library exceptions (proposed sections 12A-D, 19B, C) I now turn to the second set of provisions that the President was concerned about – the new exceptions and limitations. The President argued that the exceptions and limitations sought to be introduced go too far and would conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and cause unreasonable prejudice to the rights holder. The President was also concerned that the fair use provision suffered from vagueness and introduced a level of uncertainty that could