copyright – Page 3 – Centre on Knowledge Governance

EIFL publishes new provision on Secondary Publication Rights

Luca Schirru and Sean Flynn / 2 June, 2025

EIFL Draft Law on Copyright On May 27, 2025, EIFL launched an updated version of its Draft Law on Copyright, featuring a new provision on Secondary Publication Rights (SPRs) (more information about the process can be found here). The new provision reads as follows: This provision is part of the EIFL Draft Law on Copyright, a “practical guide to assist librarians, policy-makers and legislators when copyright laws are being updated.” The guide aims to support libraries and is continually updated considering recent policy and legislative developments and the impact of new technologies. Secondary Publication Rights According to Angelopoulos (2022, p.4), a Secondary Publication Right is a “right for the author of a scientific publication to make it available online for free following a given embargo period”. Countries such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and, more recently, Slovenia, already have provisions addressing SPRs in their legal frameworks. In Belgium, for example, even in cases where the author has assigned their rights to a publisher, if the research was publicly funded, the author can make the manuscript publicly available in open access after 12 months for the humanities and social sciences, and 6 months for other sciences (Belgium Code of Economic Law, Art. XI. 196 2 §). Secondary Publication Rights are also present in South Africa’s Copyright Amendment Bill, through the insertion of section 12D in Act 98 of 1978, as follows: SPRs are also closely linked to open access policy goals, as demonstrated by the Commission Recommendation 2018/790 on access to and preservation of scientific information. This Recommendation states that Member States should implement policies and action plans related to open access and that, as a result, “whatever the channel of publication[…], open access to publications resulting from publicly funded research be granted as soon as possible, preferably at the time of publication, and in any case no later than six months after the date of publication (no later than 12 months for social sciences and humanities).” Footnotes:

Artificial Intelligence, Blog

Fair Use and Generative AI: Reading Between the Lines of the USCO Report

Luca Schirru and Sean Flynn / 29 May, 2025

At the beginning of May, the report “Copyright and Artificial Intelligence. Part 3: Generative AI Training” was released, sparking a wide range of debates due to its content and the political issues surrounding its release. In this short contribution, we aim to briefly introduce the report and touch on some of the key content and political issues currently being discussed. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT The first thing that stands out about the report appears right on its first page: “pre-publication version”: a label reported as unusual and potentially unprecedented. The 113-page document addresses one of the most controversial issues at the intersection of copyright and Generative AI: the use of protected content to train Generative AI systems. While most sources focus on fair use, the report also includes sections on “technical background,” “infringement,” and “licensing for AI training”, all of which are a “must read,” especially for those just joining the discussion and feeling overwhelmed by the hundreds of thousands of articles, blogs, books, and other resources available on the topic. The report attempts to summarize some of the main issues in both the legal and technical fields. The approach taken by the USCO is sometimes described as “favorable to copyright owners” or as “a mixed bag”, receiving both praise and criticism on multiple fronts, as we will illustrate below. POLITICAL CONTEXT AND CONTROVERSIES The timing of the report While it may be early to determine the precise reasons behind the (unusual) release of a pre-publication version, several explanations have been speculated, though none have been confirmed. The report states that its early release was made “in response to congressional inquiries and expressions of interest from stakeholders.” However, questions have been raised that may relate to concerns about potential restrictions under Trump Administration, which is arguably aligned with positions favorable to big technology companies, as well as fear that the report could be buried in the event of the dismissal of the Register of Copyright, or the potential influence on ongoing legal cases. Regarding the latter, there have been concerns about the timing of the report and how it could interfere with the outcomes, especially the fair use analysis, of ongoing lawsuits. As noted, “it could put a thumb on the scale for how the courts will resolve these cases,” without giving the parties an opportunity to address any potential gaps in the report, which could have a significant impact on other GenAI cases. Leadership changes and copyright policy While the timing of the notice of dismissal of Shira Perlmutter (Register of Copyrights at the time the report was drafted) and the release of the report could give rise to the inference that the report was the sole reason for her dismissal, other events may have influenced the decision as well. The day before the release of the (pre-publication version of the) report, the Librarian of Congress, Carla Hayden, who had appointed Shira Perlmutter, was dismissed. Therefore, concerns about additional leadership changes may also have played a role in the decision to release the pre-publication version. An extra layer of complexity arises when one considers that Perlmutter’s position was one appointed and overseen by the legislative branch. The argument that the report may have contributed to the dismissal has often been linked to an alleged alignment between the Trump Administration’s position and that of big tech companies. This connection can be inferred from Rep. Joe Morelle’s statement, reported by POLITICO, claiming it is “no coincidence [Trump] acted less than a day after [Perlmutter] refused to rubber-stamp Elon Musk’s efforts to mine troves of copyrighted works to train AI models.” Finally, as reported by Authors Alliance, on April 30, “American Accountability Foundation urges President Trump to fire ‘deep state’ librarians, targeting Carla Hayden and Shira Perlmutter,” based on the claim that Hayden was supporting Biden policies, particularly in the areas of intellectual property and transgender rights. FAIR USE AT THE HEART OF THE DEBATE While the report addresses multiple issues, both legal and technical, the most debated (and anticipated) topics are those related to whether the use of protected content to train Generative AI systems qualifies as fair use. The fair use chapter is the longest in the report, comprising nearly half of its content. It includes a factor-by-factor analysis applied to different scenarios, with the USCO identifying the first and fourth factors as taking on particular prominence in the analysis. In the section titled “weighing the factors,” the Office states the following: “As generative AI involves a spectrum of uses and impacts, it is not possible to prejudge litigation outcomes. The Office expects that some uses of copyrighted works for generative AI training will qualify as fair use, and some will not. On one end of the spectrum, uses for purposes of noncommercial research or analysis that do not enable portions of the works to be reproduced in the outputs are likely to be fair. On the other end, the copying of expressive works from pirate sources in order to generate unrestricted content that competes in the marketplace, when licensing is reasonably available, is unlikely to qualify as fair use. Many uses, however, will fall somewhere in between.” (p.74) While there has been some agreement with certain parts of the report, such as the acknowledgment that litigation outcomes cannot be prejudged, and the view that “research and academic uses should be favored under the fair use analysis”, one of the most criticized aspects is the interpretation of the fourth factor in the fair use analysis, in which the Report concludes that original works created by AI that are not substantially similar to works used in the training may nonetheless result in “market dilution” that should weigh against a fair use analysis. According to USCO’s report: “While we acknowledge this is uncharted territory, in the Office’s view, the fourth factor should not be read so narrowly. The statute on its face encompasses any “effect” upon the potential market.373 The speed and scale at which AI systems generate content

Africa: Copyright & Public Interest, Blog

The South African Copyright Amendment Bill at the Constitutional Court: Notes from the Presidential Referral of the Bill (Part II)

Sanya Samtani / 27 May, 2025

In Part I of this blogpost, I briefly set out the procedural history of the copyright reform process that led to the Presidential Referral of the Bill to the Constitutional Court. I also briefly explained the scope of Referral proceedings and the parties involved. In this Part, I discuss the issues raised during the hearing and what to expect going forward. Issues raised during the hearing In line with the Court’s past jurisprudence, the proceedings centred around the constitutionality of the two sets of provisions referred by the President on the basis that he referred them – the fair and equitable remuneration provisions and the new exceptions and limitations. I discuss the arguments raised regarding each set in turn. I focus here on the oral submissions – the full written submissions on record are available here. Fair and equitable remuneration (proposed sections 6A, 7A, 8A) On the fair and equitable remuneration provisions, the President remained concerned that these provisions apply retrospectively which, in his view, would constitute arbitrary deprivation of property. The President explained that although Parliament deleted the specific subsections that explicitly provided for the retrospective application of the provisions, he believed that the provisions were still applicable retrospectively. Retrospectivity, he argued, would constitute a substantial interference in the copyright owner’s enjoyment of their property (and the profits derived from it) as it would open up the possibility for windfall gains for authors notwithstanding whether their original historical assignment of copyright was unfair. Moreover, the President argued that the indiscriminate application of these provisions to all past and future assignments constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property. To prevent retrospective application, the President argued that it was necessary for the language of the provisions to explicitly state that they would apply prospectively. Underlying this argument, the President confirmed that in his view, copyright constituted a constitutionally protectable set of property interests. When questioned, the President conceded that should these provisions be read exclusively prospectively they would not be unconstitutional. The President’s initial position was supported by the Freedom Front Plus. It was also supported by the Democratic Alliance who argued that the only reasonable interpretation of these provisions was that they applied retrospectively to past and future profits derived from the exploitation of the work under copyright. On a prospective interpretation, the DA argued, the language that allows the existence of an agreement to the contrary in proposed section 6A(2) would render the provision a nullity. The DA also supported the proposition that these provisions ran the risk of arbitrarily depriving copyright owners of their property on the basis that there was a substantial interference with the right by significantly reducing its value, imposing uncertainty costs upon the entire industry and interfering with the contractual autonomy of the parties. Further, the DA argued that the lack of similar language in sections 7A and 8A was irrational – and although the President adopted this argument in his oral submissions, irrationality was not expressly part of the 2020 or 2024 Referral letter, raising the question whether the Court can consider it. NAB/SANEF/CFE aligned themselves with the arguments made by the President that these provisions had retrospective effect and ran the risk of arbitrarily changing the rights negotiated and acquired by broadcasters in the current regime, asserting that the broadcasting industry may face dire consequences as a result. Parliament, however, explained in their oral submissions that they had a clear legislative intent to ensure that the impugned provisions had prospective effect. This intent was demonstrated by the deletion of the relevant subsection from all three provisions, as acknowledged by the President, in addressing the reservations set out in his 2020 Referral letter. Recreate Action aligned with Parliament’s position on the deletion of the explicit retrospectivity provisions, and argued that there is a presumption against retrospectivity in the law. Where a provision can be read prospectively, it must be read in that manner. Recreate Action responded to the DA’s argument that a prospective reading of section 6A renders it a nullity by explaining that the non-obstante clause in that section would ensure its continued application. In any event, Recreate Action argued that even if the impugned provisions applied retrospectively, that did not in and of itself render them unconstitutional. To the extent that they were a deprivation of property, Recreate Action argued that even if copyright was incorporeal constitutional property, it required a lower threshold of justification for such deprivation, and that the deprivation only encompassed a single incident of ownership – the royalty right. Finally, Recreate Action responded to the claim of indiscriminate application as arbitrariness by explaining that the standards of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ in the text of these provisions act as levers to calibrate the application of these provisions to address unequal bargaining power and prevent any windfall gains. In addition to testing these arguments, the Court raised concerns about the specificity of the President’s reservations with regard to these provisions. In particular, the Court was concerned as to whether Parliament had a meaningful opportunity to address the whole of these provisions – in other words, whether the President’s 2020 Referral letter flagged the whole of these provisions as triggering his reservations, or just the relevant subsection that explicitly provided for their retrospective application. If the Court were to find that the whole provisions were not referred to Parliament – to enable Parliament’s consideration of them prior to the Referral to the Court – this may bar the consideration of the merits. New exceptions including education and library exceptions (proposed sections 12A-D, 19B, C) I now turn to the second set of provisions that the President was concerned about – the new exceptions and limitations. The President argued that the exceptions and limitations sought to be introduced go too far and would conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and cause unreasonable prejudice to the rights holder. The President was also concerned that the fair use provision suffered from vagueness and introduced a level of uncertainty that could

Africa: Copyright & Public Interest, Blog

The South African Copyright Amendment Bill at the Constitutional Court: Notes from the Presidential Referral of the Bill (Part I)

Sanya Samtani / 27 May, 2025

On 21 and 22 May 2025, the South African Constitutional Court heard the matter of Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the Copyright Amendment Bill and the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill. The hearing in these ‘Referral proceedings’ was significant as it was only the second time in South Africa’s history that the President triggered an exceptional constitutional mechanism to refer a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the constitutionality of certain aspects instead of signing it into law. The Court’s decision in this case will determine the fate of a long drawn-out legislative reform process aiming to transform and modernise South Africa’s apartheid-era copyright law and bring it into the constitutional era. The Court adjourned to deliberate on the matter and the judgment will be handed down in a few months. In this blog post, I briefly outline the arguments advanced by the parties and amici curiae and highlight the issues for determination by the Court. While the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill is also at issue, I focus on the Copyright Amendment Bill [B13F-2017] (‘the Bill’) as the aspects of the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill that are at issue are those that incorporate the Copyright Amendment Bill. The hearing focused almost exclusively on the Copyright Amendment Bill. This blog post is in two parts: Part I deals with the procedural history that led to the Presidential Referral of the Bill and sets out an overview of the referral proceedings, and Part II deals with the issues raised during the hearing and sets out the next steps. The long and winding road to the Constitutional Court For those coming to this issue afresh, South Africa has been in the process of reforming its copyright law for over a decade, if not longer. The current Copyright Act 98 of 1978 is old-order legislation, enacted prior to democracy. While the South African Constitution allows for apartheid era legislation to be saved if it can be interpreted to be consistent with the Constitution, the Copyright Act freezes pre-constitutional economic and social relationships in the creative industry and knowledge production processes. While some parts of it may be read compatibly with the Constitution, other parts of it are in need of urgent reform. As the South African Parliament has recognised in the memorandum on the objects of the Bill, the existing arrangements have had adverse impacts upon artists due to the “power imbalance, vulnerabilities and abuse taking place in the music industry”, people with disabilities, educators and researchers. In addition to addressing this, the Bill seeks to make South African copyright law consonant with “the ever evolving digital space” as the current Act is “outdated and has not been effective in a number of areas”. In doing so, the Bill clarifies in some detail the powers and functions of the Copyright Tribunal and, for the first time, regulates collective management organisations. The procedural history leading up to the Constitutional Court hearing is central to understanding why the enactment of the Bill as a whole is subject to the Court’s determination of two narrow and specific issues. I address this briefly. Parliament passed the Copyright Amendment Bill [B13B-2017] in March 2019. The President, instead of signing the Bill, triggered a constitutional mechanism to refer the Bill back to Parliament citing procedural and substantive constitutional reservations in June 2020 (‘2020 Referral letter’). At that stage, concerned about pervasive and persistent copyright discrimination being further exacerbated by the delay, Blind SA – a disability rights organisation by and for people with visual and print disabilities – launched litigation against the state for interim relief pending the conclusion of the legislative reform process. Consequently, in 2022, the Constitutional Court in Blind SA v Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition (‘Blind SA I’) held that the Copyright Act 1978 was unconstitutional to the extent that it unfairly discriminated against people with visual and print disabilities and read-in a court-crafted remedy to rectify this discrimination with a deadline of two years from the date of judgment for Parliament to enact legislation. The remedy drew heavily from the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (‘Marrakesh VIP Treaty’), on the basis that this treaty was in the process of being domesticated through copyright reform, though South Africa had not yet acceded to it. In the meanwhile, over a period of approximately four years, Parliament considered and addressed the President’s constitutional reservations and additionally gave draft legislative effect to the Court’s judgment in Blind SA I passing the Copyright Amendment Bill [B13F-2017] in February 2024. The deadline set by the Constitutional Court in Blind SA I lapsed in September 2024, along with the court-crafted remedy, and although Parliament passed the Bill, the President did not take action in response to Parliament’s amended version. Blind SA then urgently sought from the Constitutional Court a re-reading in of the same remedy or any other remedy that would be just and equitable following the lapsing of the remedy. Days later, the President opted for an exceptional constitutional mechanism by which he referred the Bill to the Constitutional Court (‘2024 Referral letter’) citing that two of his 2020 constitutional reservations had not been ‘fully accommodated’ by Parliament (‘the Referral proceedings’ discussed below). The Court passed an interim order in December 2024 reading in once again the remedy in Blind SA I until the final determination of the matter – which took place on 7 May 2025. In Blind SA v President of the Republic of South Africa (‘Blind SA II’), rather than further extending the Blind SA I remedy, the Court took note of the significantly advanced legislative process and the fact that the President did not have any reservations concerning the provisions regarding people with disabilities and, instead, read-in those provisions and the relevant definitions from the Bill into law, until such time as amended copyright law came into force. This ensured that

Artificial Intelligence, Blog

Highlights from the USCO Report on the Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence for Copyright Policy (Part 1: Output Phase)

Luca Schirru / 19 May, 2025

About the Report In February 2025, the U.S. Copyright Office released the report “Identifying the Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence for Copyright Policy: Context and Direction for Economic Research”, edited by USCO’s chief economist, Brent Lutes. The report was produced after months of research, interactions among scholars and technical experts, and the outcomes of a roundtable event. By identifying the most pressing economic issues related to copyright and artificial intelligence (AI), the roundtable “aimed to provide a structured and rigorous framework for considering economic evidence so that the broader economic research community can effectively answer specific questions and identify optimal policy choices.” Considering the length of the report and the variety and complexity of the issues it addresses, we will split our analysis into two separate blog posts: one focusing on the output phase and the other on the input phase. Following the structure of the report, we will begin with the output-related topics: “Copyrightability of AI-Generated Works and Demand Displacement” and “Copyright Infringement by AI Output”, as these are most directly connected to copyright. For this reason, we will not summarize the section on “Commercial Exploitation of Name, Image, and Likeness”, and instead recommend that readers refer directly to the report for details on that topic. Copyrightability of AI-Generated Works and Demand Displacement This chapter, whose principal contributors are Imke Reimers and Joel Waldfogel, proposes the following question: “how the emergence of generative AI technology affects the optimal provision of copyright protection?” When discussing whether AI-generated works should be copyrighted, it connects to whether they cause a net positive value, and that there would also be the need “to be weighed against the value of human-generated works displaced by the technology”. (p.10) The substitution effect is also considered, not only in cases where AI-generated works substitute human-generated ones, but also when AI-generated works are verbatim or near-verbatim reproductions of pre-existing human-generated content. Similarly, some of these near-verbatim reproductions may decrease the value of the related human work when, for example, they provide misinformation. Such a decrease in value may also reduce interest in human-generated works. On the other hand, and from an economic perspective, the report also suggests that “all of its uses would supplant revenue for human creators. Some uses will reduce deadweight loss, replacing it with consumer surplus by allowing for additional consumption that otherwise would not occur”. (p.10) One of the effects that may be seen in the long run relates to the fact that human experimentation leads to more radical stylistic innovation and experimentation, while it is not clear “whether AI-generated output can ever engage in the same sort of experimentation and innovation as humans”. (p.11) While the report acknowledges that there is a possibility that AI may reduce production costs and be a tool to promote creativity, increase productivity, and enhance quality, it warns about the risk of less experimentation, crowding out “more risky and costly experimental creations that sometimes lead to valuable innovation”. (p.11) Displacing human creators may even be harmful to the development of Gen AI, as these models are trained with human-generated works, according to the report. A first conclusion that may be drawn from this section is that further research, including empirical research, needs to be carried out to better understand issues like the value created and displacement caused by GenAI, the decrease in the value of human-generated works, the “degree to which the fixed cost recovery problem exists for AI-generated works” (p.12), and “the demand curve and cost function for creative works”. (p.14) When it comes to offering copyright protection to these AI-generated outputs, the report suggests that it would incentivize their production and affect human output in both positive and negative ways. However, it also recalls that this may not be optimal, as “copyright inherently limits public access to existing works and thus produces a social cost”. (p.12) The report also notes that production costs may differ between human-generated and AI-generated works, and that “copyright protection only serves its economic objective if the social value of the former outweighs that of the latter. If the fixed production costs of AI-generated works are sufficiently low, the additional incentives of copyright are not necessary for reaching optimal production levels, thus, offering copyright protection would be suboptimal”. (p.12) Copyright Infringement by AI Output As previously mentioned, the report does not delve into legal issues, focusing instead on economic analysis. In the chapter primarily contributed by Joshua Gans, the author offers considerations from an economic perspective on defining the “optimal scope of what output is infringing,” noting that “copyright protection from infringement should balance the incentives to produce and the ability to consume creative works.” The author begins by explaining one of the structural dynamics of copyright, where “the mechanism used for incentivizing the production of new works (exclusive rights pertaining to the usage of a work) also limits consumers’ access to existing works”, and that the “broadest possible scope of protection could also effectively hinder new creative output for fear of liability”. (p.16) It argues that an important step in the analysis is to identify the “optimal level of market power that we wish to confer to rightsholders in the context of competing AI-generated works”, assuming this level to be the same as that used in infringement disputes involving human-generated works. The chapter proposes considering multiple, but not all, factors that may impact the balance mentioned above, and reflects on how this would be different in cases involving AI (pp.16-17) Several factors may affect the market power of the rightsholders, including but not limited to the threshold for infringement (the higher the threshold, the lower the power) and the requirements to demonstrate that the copy was infringing. On the latter, it is also argued that in the cases concerning AI-generated work, “access [to the allegedly infringed work] may be harder to dispute”. (p.17) According to the study, these factors may be helpful to understand if a rightsholder may or may not exercise its market power, but the potential value related

Blog

Educational exceptions in Copyright Amendment Bill are mandated by international law and the Constitution

InfoJustice Eds. / 16 May, 2025

By Faranaaz Veriava and Anne Marie Strohwald The Constitutional Court [in South Africa] will on 21 and 22 May 2025 hear submissions relating to the constitutionality of the Copyright Amendment Bill that has been in the making since as far back as 2015. The National Assembly voted for the Copyright Amendment Bill in 2024 amid some intense opposition. The President, instead of signing the Bill into law, invoked his presidential prerogative in terms of section 79(5) of the Constitution and referred it to the Constitutional Court, raising reservations in respect of the constitutionality of certain aspects of the Bill, including whether the educational exceptions – that exempt activities associated with teaching and research from copyright protection – are consistent with international copyright law. The Centre for Child Law, a public interest organisation and the Unesco Chair: Education Law in Africa, a rights-based think tank, both based at the University of Pretoria, have been admitted as the fifth amicus curiae in the matter. Interestingly, in a crowded house of eight amici that include publishers, authors, musicians and other creatives, the Centre and the Unesco Chair are the only amici that have been granted leave to make oral submissions in the court. At the core of their submissions is the assertion that while the President considers whether the Bill is compliant with international copyright treaties and whether the exception violates section 25(1), the property right clause, the President is completely silent on South Africa’s obligations in terms international human rights law and its broader constitutional obligations. Background to the Copyright Amendment Bill referral In 2020, the President referred the Bill back to Parliament for similar reasons. In 2021, the organisation Blind SA, frustrated by the persistent impact of delays in copyright reform that prolonged a book famine wherein blind persons had access to less than 10% of available books, instituted an application to declare the 1976 Copyright Act invalid due to its failure to provide a copyright exception for persons with visual disabilities. In 2022, the Constitutional Court in Blind SA I declared the impugned provisions, that required the permission of copyright owners – rarely provided – before their works could be reproduced in accessible formats for persons with visual and print disabilities, to be constitutionally invalid. The provision also criminalised accessible formatting without such permission. The court held that requiring the permission of the copyright owners to create accessible formats amounted to a discriminatory barrier that unfairly prevented people with visual and print disabilities from accessing copyrighted materials. The court order suspended the declaration of invalidity for 24 months and formulated an interim remedy in the form of a reading-in of a temporary provision to the Copyright Act. The suspension period lapsed in September 2024, after being voted on in Parliament, but without being signed by the President. This necessitated that Blind SA return to the court on an urgent basis. The Constitutional Court in Blind SA II held that the failure to enact the Bill within 24 months created a legal gap, reverting the Copyright Act to the position before Blind SA I, making people with visual and print disabilities vulnerable and having to make the impossible decision to either break the law or not have access to a books. It therefore read into the Act the carefully crafted education exception in the Bill that aims to enable accessible format shifting for persons with visual and print disabilities. This provision is not one of the educational exceptions that are the subject of the President’s current reservations and remains in place if, and until, the Bill is finally signed into law. Educational exceptions will ease access for poor learners and students Thus, while Blind SA II is a long-awaited victory for blind people for multiple reasons, the educational exceptions are not only included in the Bill to facilitate access to learning materials for persons with print and visual disabilities, as is suggested in the President’s submissions. The educational exceptions are necessary to ensure that all learners and students, including the poorest learners and students, have access to learning materials. This category of learners and students, while including persons with print and visual disabilities, constitutes the majority of learners and students in South Africa. Copyright, therefore, exists as a barrier to access to educational materials for poor learners and students. A wide body of evidence, including from Unesco, makes clear that there is a direct correlation between educational materials and educational outcomes. Research disaggregating data on educational outcomes further highlights that educational outcomes are worse for learners and students from poorer communities lacking access to basic educational resources. For example, copyright laws preventing the making of copies of textbooks for learners and students make access to knowledge unaffordable. The Centre and the Unesco Chair argue that the educational exceptions are necessary for South Africa to comply with international human rights law to ensure the enjoyment of three reinforcing and mutually interdependent rights: The right to education, the best interests of the child principle and the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, section 39(1) of the Constitution mandates that international laws serve as an interpretive guide to its counterparts in the Constitution. Section 233 of the Constitution also requires that, “when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”. The right to education is recognised in several international and African regional instruments, including: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) – all of which have been ratified by South Africa, thus creating obligations for South Africa as a party to these instruments. International human rights law elaborations of the right confirm that the educational exceptions are permissible. The availability of education in international human rights law refers not only to the availability of schools, but also includes the availability of resources to facilitate teaching and learning. The accessibility

Africa: Copyright & Public Interest, Blog

SA CONCOURT OPENS DOOR TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN COPYRIGHT CASE

Denise Nicholson / 15 May, 2025

In its landmark ruling on 7 May 2025, the Constitutional Court has opened the doors to access to information and accessible formats for people with disabilities. It has also paved the way for South Africa to ratify the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty. For decades, Blind SA has been lobbying against the ‘book famine’ and lack of provisions for blind and visually impaired persons in the current copyright law. This discrimination has gravely affected their social and economic development, education, work and leisure opportunities and other aspects of their lives, including lack of equal access to reading material that sighted persons have taken for granted. The law has in fact made copying and reuse of copyright work in accessible formats illegal, without permission from rightsholders, essentially criminalising people for needing to access information. Historical Context: 1999 – 2019 As early as 1999, the library and educational sectors raised concerns at a multi-stakeholder workshop convened by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) about the discriminatory nature of the current copyright law against people with disabilities. DTI proposed amendments to the Act in 2000. More restrictive provisions were proposed for education, libraries and archives, and minimal provisions were included for people with visual impairments. A task team mandated by the South African University Vice-Chancellors’ Association of South Africa (SAUVCA) and the Committee of Technikons (CTP), predecessors of University South Africa (USAf), challenged the proposed amendments to the Act in Parliament. These proposals were subsequently withdrawn and not included in the Amended Copyright Act of 2002, which then only addressed needle time for musicians. The task team had already succeeded in stopping more restrictive draft Regulations being passed in 1998. From 2002 until 2009 there was a legislative impasse with regard to copyright reform. Due to many problems in the music industry, the Department of Trade and Industry decided to commence a process of reform in 2009. It commissioned various research studies and established a Copyright Review Commission to investigate ongoing problems in the music industry. The DTI convened workshops for stakeholder groups and input was given on various aspects of the copyright law. To ensure a holistic approach to the 1978 Act, the DTI was provided with important documents and resources relating to education, libraries and other information services, and persons with disabilities, and other relevant issues sourced from WIPO, WTO, UNESCO, Creative Commons, the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA), Electronic Information for Libraries (EIFL)’s Model Copyright Law, and from regional copyright project findings and local organisations. Appropriate clauses and provisions were also submitted to the DTI relating to countries with progressive copyright laws where developed countries were enjoying benefits that South Africa, a developing country, still did not have in its copyright law. In July 2015 the DTI published a draft Copyright Amendment Bill for public comment and it was also discussed at a multistakeholder workshop convened by the DTI in Gauteng. After receipt of many submissions and necessary edits and amendments, the Bill was forwarded to Parliament in 2017. The Bill included Section 19D with appropriate provisions for people with disabilities, including those who are blind, deaf, dyslexic or suffer from other disabilities that prevent them from accessing information. In 2013, South Africa strongly supported the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled. The Treaty came into effect in 2016, but South Africa did not ratify it, stating that its national copyright law would need to be amended first to include appropriate provisions for people with disabilities. Some years later, it confirmed that once the Copyright Amendment Bill has been signed, it will move to ratify the Treaty. Parliamentary Approval; Presidential Rejection The first Parliamentary process took over two years but the Bill was finally passed by both Houses of Parliament in 2019. It was then referred to the President for assent, but he did not act on the Bill for a period of 15 months. The President was being lobbied strongly by rightsholders, collecting societies and multinationals, and was receiving unprecedented pressure from the US Trade Representative’s Office (USTR) and the EU Commission, to stop the Bill. This led him to decide not to sign the Bill and to refer it back for Parliamentary review on 16 June 2020. He requested a review of certain clauses, including fair use, exceptions for education and academic activities, libraries, archives, museum and galleries, and temporary copies, questioning their constitutionality. Notably, these reservations did not include Section19D. This also led to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry agreeing to send the Bill for retagging from a Section 75 Bill (National) to a Section 76 Bill (Provincial), which resulted in a drawn-out process through all nine Provincial Legislatures. Blind South Africa Litigation According to previous commentary, “Recognising that the referral would result in an inordinate delay, Blind SA approached the Gauteng High Court in 2021, primarily seeking to have the Copyright Act declared unconstitutional to the extent that it “limits and/or prevents persons with visual and print disabilities accessing works under copyright that persons without such disabilities are able to access”. Blind SA also sought an order reading in the provisions of the amendment bill that sought to give effect to the Marrakesh Treaty”.[1] On 7 December 2021, the Gauteng High Court ruled that the current Act is unconstitutional as it relates to people with blind and visual impairments . On 21 September 2022, the Constitutional Court confirmed this ruling and made a landmark decision, marking the first time in its 27-year history that it addressed a copyright law case. The Court recognised that the absence of provisions for accessible formats in copyright law constitutes disability discrimination. This ruling set a global precedent, affirming that copyright law, like any other law, must be interpreted in a way that aligns with constitutional principles, including the rights of people with disabilities. As an interim solution, the Court read-in a temporary provision (Section 13A) into the current Act, allowing for the creation

Education

The Importance of Copyright Exceptions for Teachers and Learners

InfoJustice Eds. / 8 May, 2025

by Dr. Mugwena Maluleke, President of Education International (EI) and General Secretary of the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) On 21 May 2025, the Constitutional Court in South Africa will consider the constitutionality of the Copyright Amendment Bill passed by parliament in 2019 and again in 2024. The new Bill introduces exceptions and limitations to copyright to allow educators to copy, share and adapt excerpts of copyrighted learning materials in the classroom. In this contribution to the debate, Mugwena Maluleke highlights the education crisis facing millions of learners, especially in Africa and the Global South, and the importance of copyright reforms that increase access to learning materials. This article was first presented as a keynote input to the Conference on “Copyright and the Public Interest in Africa and the Global South on 6th Feb 2025 in Cape Town. You can watch the video recording of this presentation here. Dear colleagues, It is an honour to join you today in Cape Town as we reaffirm our shared mission of ensuring equitable access to knowledge and protection of traditional knowledge for Africa. Without reiterating much of what Dr. Schönwetter has eloquently stated in his welcoming address, I extend my gratitude to all those involved in hosting this conference and to all of you attending. Thank you for your commitment to copyright law reform. Reflecting on my childhood in rural Limpopo, we were compelled to learn in English and later in Afrikaans, which led us to stand against the apartheid government in 1976. We were never given the opportunity to learn in our own language. This experience underscores the profound impact that learning materials have on a child’s potential in school. In the quest for knowledge equity, every child deserves the right to learn in their own language. Today, I stand before you not only as the President of Education International but also as the General Secretary of the South African Democratic Teachers Union, representing more than 70% of educators and education workers in South Africa. Charles Darwin, the father of evolution, once said, “It is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds itself.” The Global Status of Teachers Report, launched on the International Day of Education, January 24 this year, revealed a shocking shortage of 44 million teachers worldwide. A major catalyst for this shortage is the inability to attract and retain teachers due to inadequate conditions for providing quality teaching. Debrah Ruh, a global inclusivity strategist, noted that “accessibility allows us to tap into everyone’s potential.” UNESCO’s Framework for Action recognizes knowledge as part of the right to education for a reason: it is crucial for teachers to have access to teaching and learning materials specifically designed for educational purposes. Fair copyright legislation is essential to enable teachers to adapt and use materials, enrich them, make them context-specific, decolonize our knowledge production and consumption in education, and address an increasingly diverse student body. DECOLONISATION OF KNOWLEDGE and DECRIMINALISATION OF TEACHERS Having mentioned decolonisation of knowledge production and consumption in education, I must add that this implores us to embark on a journey of decolonisation, peeling back the layers of oppression that have been ingrained in our consciousness. This is not merely an act of dismantling the physical symbols of colonialism, but a profound transformation of our mental landscapes. As we lift the veils of ignorance and prejudice, we must replace them with the light of wisdom and understanding. Decolonisation is a reawakening, a reclamation of our heritage and identity. May I also add that education is the bridge that connects our past struggles to our future triumphs. The right to education is a fundamental human right. Our teachers should not be criminalised for striving to provide quality education to our children. Unfortunately, copyright laws for education are often overly restrictive, creating barriers for teachers and the right to education. Global EI research shows that teachers in many Latin American and African countries are particularly disadvantaged by copyright legislation, forcing them to work in legal grey zones or stop using important teaching materials. The use of digital materials and adaptations for children with disabilities poses a particular challenge for the teaching profession. Among 37 countries studied in a recent report by wireless connectivity specialist Airgain, South Africa ranks as one of the worst countries for digital readiness. THE GLOBAL EDUCATION CRISIS Recent studies highlight the urgent need for improved access to education. The 2025 Global Estimates Update by Education Cannot Wait reveals that 234 million school-aged children in crises worldwide require urgent support to access quality education, an increase of 35 million over the past three years. Refugees, internally displaced children, girls, and children with disabilities are among the most affected. The report emphasizes that these growing needs are rapidly outpacing education aid funding and calls for urgent additional financing to address this global silent emergency. Access to appropriate learning materials is a key strategy for achieving the first means of implementation (4a) under SDG4. The supporting Framework for Action Education 2030 highlights access to learning materials as one of the core strategic approaches for implementing the goal: “Education institutions and programs should be adequately and equitably resourced, with safe, environment-friendly, and easily accessible facilities; sufficient numbers of quality teachers and educators using learner-centered, active, and collaborative pedagogical approaches; and books, other learning materials, open educational resources, and technology that are non-discriminatory, learning conducive, learner-friendly, context-specific, cost-effective, and available to all learners – children, youth, and adults.” At the heart of Education International’s Go Public, Fund Education campaign is the principle of putting people before profit. The message is clear: we want creators and authors of material to be compensated fairly, but we do not want intermediaries in the copyright business, such as publishers and streaming executives, to create profit margins that deter access to learning materials

Africa: Copyright & Public Interest, Blog

South African apex court recognises the “constitutional imperatives of equality and dignity for persons with disabilities” in landmark copyright judgment

Sanya Samtani / 8 May, 2025

On 7 May 2025, the Constitutional Court of South Africa handed down judgment in Blind SA v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2025] ZACC 9 (‘Blind SA II’). The judgment read-in an immediately operational accessible format shifting provision for people with all disabilities across the spectrum as well as expressly providing for the cross-border exchange of accessible materials without the requirement of authorisation. In doing so, it gave effect to South Africa’s constitutional and international obligations to ensure that people with disabilities do not experience unfair discrimination (and other rights violations) – in this case, by the operation of copyright legislation. It also transformed South African law to align with the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (‘Marrakesh VIP Treaty’) and, by addressing this provision to people with all disabilities, it went beyond Marrakesh’s “floor”, to fulfil its obligations under the South African Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). Blind SA II is the latest major instalment in a long-standing – and ongoing – saga of South Africa’s copyright reform process that began over a decade ago. South Africa’s Copyright Act 98 of 1978 does not contain provisions that explicitly permit accessible format shifting. People with disabilities have thus had to expose themselves to criminal and civil sanction to access educational and cultural materials that are unavailable in accessible formats. On this basis, and due to the protracted reform process, Blind SA, represented by SECTION27, approached the High Court in 2021, arguing that the lack of such provisions in the Copyright Act constituted unfair discrimination against people with disabilities, and violated several rights in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights including the rights to equality, dignity, education, culture and freedom of expression. The High Court held that the Act was thus unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of the Act to this extent in Blind SA v Minister of Trade and Industry and Others [2022] ZACC 33 (‘Blind SA I’). Writing elsewhere, I have conceptualised this as copyright discrimination. To remedy the constitutional defect, the Constitutional Court read-in a court-crafted provision (s 13A) that explicitly permitted accessible format shifting – but limited its scope of application to literary and artistic works and to people with visual and print disabilities only. Mindful of the ongoing legislative process, the Court suspended the declaration of invalidity and limited the reading-in remedy to a period of two years – after which it envisioned that the reform process would be concluded. However, on 21 September 2024, the remedy ordered by the Court in Blind SA I lapsed, creating – in the Court’s own words in Blind SA II – an “immediate rights vacuum affecting the constitutional rights of visually and print-impaired persons” [para 55]. Although Parliament had acted within the time frame set by the Court’s order by passing the Copyright Amendment Bill in February 2024, the President did not make a decision on whether to sign the Bill into law within the prescribed time frame. Following the lapsing of the remedy, Blind SA urgently approached the Constitutional Court seeking relief amongst other things on the basis that the scheme of copyright – and its criminal and civil consequences for infringement – required a clear statement of permitted acts that were exempted from infringement. Following the lapsing of the remedy, the legal position was unclear, creating uncertainty in the face of confirmed constitutional rights violations. Blind SA thus sought a re-reading in of the same remedy (s 13A) until the process concluded, or any other remedy that the Court considered just and equitable. Days after Blind SA’s application was filed, on 10 October 2024, the President triggered a rare constitutional mechanism, declining to sign the Bill into law and instead referring it to the Constitutional Court citing that two of his constitutional reservations, previously raised in 2020, when he referred a previous version of the Bill to Parliament, had not been fully accommodated by Parliament. Notably, his reservations did not concern the accessible format shifting and cross border exchange provisions (proposed s 19D of the Bill) [para 53]. In the words of the Court, “the provision maintains its constitutional integrity and remains separate from the concerns raised in the President’s referral”[para 57]. However, due to the fact that these provisions were part of the Bill being impugned by the President, they also remain in abeyance. The Court is now due to hear the matter concerning the President’s referral on 21 and 22 May 2025 (‘the Referral proceedings’) that will determine the eventual fate of the Copyright Amendment Bill. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court held a hearing in November 2024 where it considered Blind SA’s application for urgent relief – in light of the President’s referral. As none of the parties disputed urgency, the hearing centred around what a just and equitable remedy would look like, given the circumstances. Subsequently, in an interim order dated 18 December 2024, to remain in force until the Court’s final judgment in the case, the Court read-in once again its remedy from Blind SA I (s 13A), effectively ensuring that people with visual and print disabilities could continue to engage in accessible format shifting without it being considered an infringement of copyright. The lacuna in the law was temporarily filled. This brings us to 7 May 2025. The Court handed down its judgment in Blind SA II summarising that back in 2022, “the constitutional defect that necessitated this Court’s intervention did not lie in any specific provision of the Copyright Act that needed to be struck down, but rather in the absence of necessary provisions to protect the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities”[para 47], and given the change in circumstances in 2025, when considering an appropriate just and equitable remedy “[t]he potential violation of fundamental rights emerges as the decisive consideration, particularly given the absence of certainty regarding the Bill’s eventual assent”[para

Blog, Trade Agreements & IP

The Unclear Status of Copyright Exceptions and Limitations in the UK-India Free Trade Agreement

Jonathan Band / 8 May, 2025

On May 6, 2025, the United Kingdom (UK) and India announced that they had reached agreement on a bilateral free trade deal that includes a chapter on intellectual property.However, no agreement text was released. Rather, the UK Department for Business & Trade issued a summary of the agreement’s terms, and the summary acknowledged that “work is continuing to finalise the legal text and resolve the last issues.” In other words, at this point there is just an agreement to agree, rather than a real agreement. According to the summary, the IP chapter “will support our economies through effective and balanced protection and enforcement of IP rights.” The chapter will cover copyright and related rights, designs, trademarks, geographical indications, patents, and trade secrets, as well as the enforcement of IP rights. The summary provides little detail concerning copyright and related rights. It simply states that India will also commit to engaging on aspects of copyright and related rights, addressing the interests of UK creators, rights holders, and consumers. This includes around public performance rights and artist’s resale rights, which acknowledge the importance of royalty rights. India will also conduct an internal review of their copyright terms of protection. Further, the summary notes that the chapter “will not commit the UK to domestic legislative change, nor will it undermine the UK’s own IP system or our international positions on IP.” Significantly, the summary is silent on copyright exceptions and limitations. In 2022, a draft of the UK’s proposed text for the IP chapter was leaked. The language concerning copyright exceptions and limitations was limited to the Berne Three Step Test and other treaties: Article H.7: Limitations and Exceptions 1. Each Party may introduce limitations or exceptions in its domestic law to the rights provided for in this Section [H]. but shall confine such limitations or exceptions to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of covered subject matter, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 2. This Article is without prejudice to the limitations and exceptions to any rights permitted by international agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, the WCT. or the WPPT. The summary asserts that the agreement would support the economies of the UK and India through “balanced protection” of IP rights, but nothing in the summary, or the UK’s 2022 draft text, reflects balanced protection with respect to copyright. The Three Step Test, by itself, is too ambiguous to provide meaningful balance. Hopefully India insisted upon language that clarified that both parties had the flexibility to adopt more open-ended fair dealing or fair use provisions, like those recently adopted by former British colonies such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Nigeria. For example, the agreement could include language similar to Article 11.18 of the Regional Cooperation for Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020. That language provides that 3. Each Party shall endeavour to provide an appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights system, among other things by means of limitations and exceptions consistent with paragraph 1, for legitimate purposes, which may include education, research, criticism, comment, news reporting, and facilitating access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled. 4. For greater certainty, a Party may adopt or maintain limitations or exceptions to the rights referred to in paragraph 1 for fair use, as long as any such limitation or exception is confined as stated in paragraph 1. India initially participated in the RCEP negotiations, but withdrew in 2019 over issues unrelated to intellectual property.